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The future of social protection is in doubt. In today’s the continuously changing world, the European –and not only- crisis has
reached to an extent that calls for immediate actions. Despite the disastrous results, opportunities exist that were inconceivable a
decade before. The crucially importance area mostly in need is the societal one because the world we live in consists of the civil
society that lives and functions within it. Thankfully, for every obstacle appeared many potential solutions are provided. In the
present study - analysis we will try to understand under which circumstances a new system can be implemented, as an alternative
program of social security -in contrast to the present ones- that is capable of creating the incentives for ind ividual/private
initiative for self-insurance rather than the present system based in the central governmental.In Greece, many measures have been
taken, over the past three years, in the field of social insurance. The Insurance Act has been modified several times in the last
decade. In this study we will present and analyze the relevant legal provisions in comparison with the last one and with the aims
of the European policy in this sector.Through comparative analys is in countries that have already implemented this scheme we
will try to determine to what extent this newly introduced system can have positive results for the well being of a state, especially
in Greek society, and under which conditions it can become reality. Through our research we will try to answer the raised
questions; what is this new phenomenon, what are the potential hazards, can this innovative system work for Greece?
Additionally, what are the barriers or boundaries that the state raises in terms of bureaucracy and law?
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The world we live in is a comprised of a complex of sub-systems, policy making for different governments and
agenda setting for a variety of multifaceted issues. Over the last few years due to involuntary negative economic
state of several countries in Europe and also overseas, there is a great need to explore the options available to change
the current system or some specific key areas in order to achieve stability, development, security and wellbeing not
only for the state but also for the people itself.
One of the areas needing direct intervention is the employment/labor sector particularly with respect to the
unemployment funds. The raised issue is for the inadequate till now insurance system to provide the necessary
incentive for people in the inconvenient situation of a job loss to search for a new employment but it is also the
burden of social state to direct funds on the correct course. The unemployment insurance measures exist to provide
against hardship that is otherwise caused by unemployment(Feldstein, Altman, 2007).
Furthermore, it is evident that being in the state of unemployment causes different spillovers. Several health
issues for the individual might be triggered such as stress or depression, and criminality increased as some turn to
theft or fraud. There are also huge economic impacts on the state function that move towards instability.
While unemployment rates increase money, economy and consumption shift inversely; they are decreasing. From
an economic and political perspective, unemployment needs to be dealt with in order to understand the reason why
these problems occur and in the end to achieve consumption smoothing
(http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/consumption-smoothing.asp).
This paper intends to introduce a possible solution to the increasing unemployment rates and to extenuate the
workload of a state when it comes to the state’s money control for this particular area.
Below, it is presented a graph describing the unemployment rates in the European Union of all the 27 Member
States from 2000 to 2012. It is obvious that it is continuously growing for all the European states and that should
encourage each and every government to find an effective solution for this matter of excruciating importance.
Fig. 1the unemployment rates in the European Union
We argue that the new system, UISA†, will substitute the current one, UI‡, smoothly and with direct positive
results. As a matter of fact UISA is being implemented and used in Chile. Chile faced the same issue of many
workers losing their jobs leading to a large number of people turning to the unemployment insurance fund for
economical support. The result of this phenomenon was that because of the increase of the unemployed the taxes
rose but the benefits were attractive enough for unemployed people not to seek employment. So the state addressed
the problem by changing the UI system to the UISA model and the results were more than satisfying.
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Moreover we are given the opportunity to promote this issue and raise the awareness of academia and policy
makers to make an effort towards another direction of social protection by providing a plausible solution for
countries such as Greece. Apart from analyzing the two different types of systems we will try to investigate if this
newly introduced system can actually be implemented in the legal system and what are the expected results.
To begin with, we have to understand what the Unemployment Insurance system is, how it works and what are
the advantages or disadvantages of this regime. After analyzing the current system then we will be qualified to
criticize it and introduce the innovative UI Savings Account system.
UI is a net mechanism of the welfare state protecting the individuals after their departure from the workplace, by
providing financial support that allows for adequate time to search for new employment. Every employed individual
is contributing through their taxes to a social fund. So after a lay off, if the criteria are met, an individual should be
registered as unemployed, and depending on the working duration, salary and contributions, is entitled by the state
to earn unemployment insurance payments. This salary is subsidiary and might be larger or smaller depending on
the years of employment, seniority and contributions.
Apart from the labor rules and law coming from the European Union, in order to deal with this situation, each
state has implemented and integrated their own system. They might be not exactly the same but in basic structure
and practice are similar (Feldstein, Altman, 2007). The current system is divided in two major categories; the public
social assistance/insurance and the private unemployment insurance. The characteristics of the first one are that
there is a limited quantity and duration of financial aid that is based on specific requirements and that premiums are
paid by all working individuals. The second one is supplementary to the public insurance, and is given as a
severance pay. Finally, the contributions of an individual determine the pension at retirement age. This system
actually works because the individuals in the work force are paying for the unemployment benefits and the
retirement programs through the pay as you earn system by deducting a specific amount of money from their salary.
But here we have to consider the problem of the aging population because there are less active employers than the
number needed to cover the amount of pensioners and unemployed. That is also one of the reasons that the states are
in crisis, because of their inability to keep the insurance mechanism in a healthy state.
The system of reimbursing individuals for losing their job that is currently in use has some flaws. Because of the
amount of the benefits it creates disincentive effects on the search for a new job (Tatsiramos, 2006). This issue is
defined as “moral hazard”
(http://iate.europa.eu/iatediff/SearchByQuery.do?method=searchDetail&lilId=895980&langId=&query=moral%20h
azard&sourceLanguage=en&domain=0&matching=&start=0&next=1&targetLanguages=el) and actually explains
that receipt of benefits are creates an incentive to the unemployed to stay more in that state of earning funds from
the state resulting the rise of unemployment rates and length in the European countries (Feldstein, Altman, 1998, p.
29).
Another issue that comes up concerns “adverse selection” (Castro-Fernandez, Wodon, 1198). The insurer, in that
case the state, cannot observe how much effort the unemployed put into searching for work§. It is observed the
existence of the phenomenon of free riding meaning that an individual without contributing to the state while
misusing the service goods and common property resources.
Workers usually have a better knowledge of their unemployment risk than (private or public) unemployment
insurance schemes. According to Chassagnon and Chiappori “the concept of adverse selection refers to situations
where, before the contract is signed, one party (in general the insured agent) has an information advantage upon the
other. In most models, it is assumed that clients know better their own risk than insurance companies; the latter may
then use deductible as a way of separating individuals with different riskiness. Moral hazard, on the other hand,
occurs when the outcome of the relationship (here, the occurrence of an accident or a claim) depends, in a stochastic
http://newmonetarism.blogspot.nl/2010/07/unemployment-insurance.html , accessible on April 2013
1.2. Unemployment Insurance
§
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way, on a decision that is privately made by one party and not observable by the other” (Castro-Fernandez, Wodon,
1198).
Moreover, because exactly of the reason that employees have to support the unemployment fund through their
salary, there is the result of the deduction of their base pays that reinforces the black labor market, in order to avoid
the contribution.
Apart from all the disadvantages mentioned, it would be negligent not to mention the positive aspects of the
system. There are two main advantages. Firstly, the unemployed has the ability to search for a job for a longer
period of time and find something that fits its qualifications. It might spend more funds from the insurance fund but
the job that they will find later is reimbursing the losses. Secondly it supports solidarity among the citizens and
strengthens the welfare state.
There is a plethora of alternatives provided in order to tackle this systemic default. First of all,
the easiest solution that someone might think of is money saving, although not everyone has
money surplus. In the same skeptic borrowing money is also another solution but it just covers
the problem without eliminating. Furthermore this money will be returned double because of the
interest rates, except if the borrowed funds come from family members, but that still is not
feasible because not all can afford it. Secondly, there is always the alternative of a private
insurance but as mentioned before, through that regime the only thing achieved is to cause
increased costs. Finally, there is the alternative solution of the transformation of the social
insurance area into a different system, the Unemployment Insurance Savings Account.
In this section we will try to analyze the UISA as an alternative solution. We will answer the question of how it
works, what are the advantages and disadvantages, if it affects solidarity and the preconditions needed for
implementation.
“UISA” stands for Unemployment Insurance Savings Account and actually it precisely explains that “this system
requires individuals to save a modest share of wages in special accounts and to draw unemployment compensation
from these accounts instead of taking state unemployment benefits”
(http://iate.europa.eu/iatediff/SearchByQuery.do?method=searchDetail&lilId=1355101&langId=&query=adverse%
20selection&sourceLanguage=en&domain=0&matching=&start=0&next=1&targetLanguages=el).
The main target of the new system is to set the correct incentives. First of all it avoids moral hazard because it is
individualized and also it avoids the issue of adverse selection by making contributions mandatory
(http://newmonetarism.blogspot.nl/2010/07/unemployment-insurance.html). What is being sought through this
system** is the opposition to a free lunch; people will avoid misusing the governmental benefits and taking
advantage of their situation against the rest of the society. Workers are not motivated to take the government funds,
so it improves the work incentives by motivating individuals to seek jobs. In terms of finding a job it is more
flexible because it allows mobility in various sectors. Additionally, the saved money of the individual can be
invested in any way they want; they can manage the savings as they like and think is more feasible for them.
It is already achieved in many countries of Latin America who were facing the same problem (e.g. Chile, Brazil,
Columbia)
2. Different Solutions
3. Unemployment Insurance SavingsAccount (UISA)
**
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Wage and salary earners contribute to their own accounts. The minimum deposit is 4% of their salary to their
individual insurance account. They have the ability to withdraw the gathered amount if they lose their jobs and the
withdrawn amount is the same as under the UI system rules. If they retire with a negative balance it is forgiven and
if they die with a positive one it is given to their families. The negative balance can be considered as a negative
aspect of the system but Feldstein and Altman claim in their analysis that even among individuals who experience
unemployment, most would have positive account balances at the end of their unemployment spell. The cost to
taxpayers of forgiving the negative balances was estimated to be less than half the cost of the current system
(Chassagnon, Chiappori, 1995).
Moreover, they gather benefits if they are long term employed but they can lose them if they remain unemployed
for a longer period of time. Benefits are determined by the percentages of the earnings that can be deposited, and
that is the reason why employees will be even more unwilling to lose their job. In the case that the amount of money
is not sufficient to cover their expenses they can borrow money from the state that they repay after being employed.
From the above argument it comes the most important part of the UISA system. Apart from the insurance account
people will continue paying taxes to the government, because these programs work in parallel. So, if someone wants
to raise his benefits he will be motivated and willing to accept labor insurance and not to work with black money. So
the gain is double for both the individual and the government. The contribution benefits link is visible in contrast to
the UI system. Subsequent to the account, because it is a procedure through the banking system, otherwise the
savings cannot be controlled; monitoring is facilitated because in the past it was really hard to identify the correct
unemployment rates. Finally, consumption smoothing is achieved, because the individuals tend to more
efficientlymanage their own savings, especially when they are unemployed (Feldstein, Altman, 1998).
This scheme embodies a Common Solidarity Fund which is financed by taxes and by individuals’ additional
contributions. Through this, solidarity among the society is reinforced and gives the feeling of the common good,
mutual benefit society and support to ones in need. In this public fund are placed contributions which help those
whose balance is insufficient or those that for a variety of reasons cannot find a job. Thus the redistribution is
interpersonal targeting to protect the younger, poorer and less educated in the welfare state, for example through
subsidies.
On the other hand, there are some disadvantages that we have to describe. In order to set up the system extra
administrative costs will be needed. Someone also could argue that mandatory participation is unnecessary. We also
have to consider that if the benefits are large then the individuals might stay unemployed for longer (but this is their
own choice) and that they might precipitate firing in order to access the funds (unlikely though). Lastly the
bargaining power of the employees is significantly reduced because the individual is more likely to accept an
insufficient job far away from its preferences or with lower salary in order not to lose the benefits (Castro-
Fernandez, Wodon, 2001).
If we can make a positive assumption for the newly introduced system that can actually work, we can argue that
instable countries that might implement it they have much more to gain at the administrative and societal level. The
chances for success are promising only if the governments are motivated to correctly implement it.
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